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Conventional wisdom dictates that the Internet is a medium in 
which federalism is destined to fail.  By virtue of its decentralized design, 
the Internet naturally resists regulation by a diverse set of government 
actors.  Indeed, courts have reasoned that federalism on the Internet is 
either technologically impossible or constitutionally prohibited.  The 
emergence of geolocation technologies, which make it possible to quickly, 
cheaply, and accurately identify an Internet user’s location, challenges this 
dominant understanding and opens the door to new approaches that could 
radically alter the way electronic commerce is governed.  To illustrate this 
point, this Article explores the ways that such technologies could be used 
to make Internet gambling regulation more responsive to longstanding 
federalism principles.  As demonstrated below, geolocation technologies 
have the potential to make Internet gambling law both more effective and 
more efficient by enabling each state to enforce its own substantive 
regulations
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Rubinowitz, and Jacqueline D. Lipton, as well as Ed Brayton, Tom Gaeta, Richard Glover, 
Kristen Knapp, Jeremy Wilson, Christin Sullivan, and the Staff of the Columiba Science and 
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I. AN IMPENETRABLE PROBLEM? 
Over the last decade, Internet gambling regulation has begun to seem like an 
impenetrable problem—a Gordian knot—that both state and federal regulators have been 
unable to solve.  Motivated by the moral concerns of their citizens and a desire to protect 
revenue from casinos within their borders, several states have waged aggressive 
campaigns against Internet gambling.2  While states have historically regulated gambling 
pursuant to their police powers,3 recent state enforcement efforts have been hindered by 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, which forbids state regulation of interstate commerce.4   
The federal government’s parallel effort to police Internet gambling has also 
fallen short, due to a lack of clarity in current law and the difficulties associated with 
regulation of offshore casino operators.5  Even if both of those barriers could be 
overcome, a uniform federal approach might still be viewed as an unwarranted intrusion 
into an area best left to state regulation.6  Ultimately, the fact that Americans continue to 
spend over seven billion dollars on Internet gambling each year demonstrates just how 
                                                
2  See infra Part II.A.   
3  See, e.g., Pasados de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) 
(stating that regulation of gambling concerns a state’s “interest in the health, safety, and welfare 
of its citizens”); Casino Ventures v. Stewart, 183 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
gambling restrictions “represent a well-recognized exercise of state police power”).  
4  See Scott Olson, Betting No End to Internet Gambling, 4 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 2, 7-9 
(1999); see also Ari Lanin, Note, Who Controls the Internet? States' Rights and the Reawakening 
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1423, 1448 (2000) (“[W]hen a state 
attempts constitutionally to regulate Internet communications, the result will almost inevitably be 
a gutted, ineffective law.”).  
5  See Gary Rotstein, Despite Law, Computer Bets Beat the Odds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
Jan. 31, 2009, at A1; Tony Batt, Bet Ban Stymies Federal Officials, Las Vegas Review-Journal, 
Apr. 3, 2008, at 1D (“Federal regulators . . . acknowledged . . . [that] prohibition of online 
wagering may be ineffective.”); see also Jacob Sullum, Some Bets Are Off: The Strangely 
Selective and Self-Defeating Crackdown on Internet Gambling, Reason, June 2008, at 38, 41-44; 
Benjamin C. Wickert, Note, All In, But Left Out: How the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act Seeks to Eradicate Online Gambling in the United States, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & 
Tech. L. 215, 235-236 (2007).  
6  See David Goodman, Comment, Proposals for a Federal Prohibition of Internet 
Gambling: Are There Any Other Viable Solutions to this Perplexing Problem?, 70 Miss. L.J. 375, 
393-399 (2000); see also Cathy McKitrick, Utahn on Gambling: Deal Us Out, Salt Lake Trib., 
Dec. 26, 2008.  
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unsuccessful recent state and federal enforcement efforts have been.7  Making matters 
worse, prohibition has begun to trigger sizeable direct costs for the entire nation via 
World Trade Organization (WTO) sanctions, as well as indirect costs to states favoring 
legalized gambling in the form of lost tax revenues and licensing fees.8   
Like Alexander’s sword centuries ago,9 modern geolocation technologies are 
poised to solve the problems described above in a single stroke.  Geolocation 
technologies make this remarkable result possible by allowing Web sites to quickly and 
automatically determine an Internet uesr’s physical location.  By customizing content and 
regulating access according to a user’s location, sites can re-create jurisdictional borders 
on the Internet,10 thus mitigating the cross-border reach of gambling activities which, 
prior to the Internet era, were possible only on a local scale.  To implement this solution, 
Congress would need to enact a new regulatory framework with three main features.  
First, the framework would empower states to choose from a limited “menu” of 
substantive Internet gambling policies.11  Second, the framework would require Internet 
gambling providers doing business within the United States to utilize modern geolocation 
technologies—thereby enabling sites to identify users by state and allow or deny access 
accordingly.  Third, the framework would provide states with a flexible legal remedy to 
be used against sites that offer unauthorized gambling services.  This three-part approach 
mirrors the recently proposed Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and 
Enforcement Act (IGRCPEA)12 in most respects, while differing in a few key details.13 
The success of a framework like the one described above depends on the answers 
to two fundamental questions.  First, what is technologically possible?  This question 
centers on architecture—the Internet’s design and the consequences of that design for 
                                                
7  See Rich Cholodofsky, Government Perplexed by Internet Gambling, Pittsburgh 
Tribune-Review, Jan. 15, 2006, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_413664.html.  
8  See infra Part II.B.   
9  For a brief account of the tale of Alexander the Great and the Gordian knot, see Marshall 
Monroe Kirkman, History of Alexander the Great 153-56 (1913).  
10  See Joel D. Reidenberg, Symposium: Current Debates in the Conflict of Laws: Choice of 
Law and Jurisdiction on the Internet: Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1951, 1956 (2005); Anick Jesdanun, Not-Quite-Worldwide Web, Balt. Sun, July 15, 2004, at 8D 
(discussing the role of geolocation in modern Internet advertising). 
11  The contents of such a “menu” might include one option permitting all forms of Internet 
gambling, one option permitting mixed games of skill and chance, such as poker, and one option 
prohibiting all forms of Internet gambling.  For a more detailed discussion of this issue and other 
details of the proposed framework, see infra Part IV.A.  
12  See H.R. 2267, 111th Cong. (2009). 
13  See infra Part IV.A.  
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law.14  Government regulation of Internet gambling can only succeed if practical means 
are available to make that regulation effective.  For years, scholars and litigants have 
argued that the decentralized design and global reach of the Internet made it 
technologically (as opposed to legally) impossible to impose differing—and sometimes 
conflicting—bodies of substantive law on online enterprises.15  Today’s geolocation 
software challenges this architectural claim as “[c]ommercial pressures and the dynamic 
nature of the Internet have resulted in . . . the re-creation of geographic origin and 
destination” online.16  Indeed, while Internet content providers may have been unable to 
tailor their offerings by jurisdiction five or ten years ago,17 that capability not only exists 
but is widely used today.18   
This shift in architecture gives rise to the second question: is a jurisdictionally-
differentiated regulatory regime normatively desirable?  This Article argues that the clear 
answer to that question is “yes.”  Jurisdictional differentiation would respect important 
federalism principles and bring a greater degree of democratic legitimacy to Internet 
gambling law.  Such an approach would also be considerably more effective than the 
current regime as gambling sites would have two extremely powerful incentives to 
comply with the law: freedom from prosecution by the newly empowered state attorneys 
general and the reputational benefits associated with a government operating license.  
Moreover, jurisdictional differentiation would make the law more efficient by 
internalizing the substantial costs associated with prohibition, thereby eliminating the free 
rider problem posed by the current regime.   
These advantages would not come cost-free, however.  Jurisdictional 
differentiation could threaten the fundamentally open character of the Internet,19  lead to 
                                                
14  Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. 
Rev. 501, 508 (1999) (claiming that the Internet can be regulated to the extent that the 
architecture is designed to allow for particular kinds of regulation).  
15  See Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Reidenberg, 
supra note 10, at 1952 (citing arguments advanced by Yahoo! in Tribunal de grande instance 
[T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000 (Fr.), available at 
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm, translated at 
http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html, a case in which Yahoo! was held criminally liable for the 
display of Nazi memorabilia).  
16  Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1956.   
17  See Am. Libraries Ass'n, 969 F. Supp. at 170-71 (“The Internet is wholly insensitive to 
geographic distinctions. . . . [N]o aspect of the Internet can feasibly be closed off to users from [a 
particular] state.”).  
18  See Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 946, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2006); 
Frank Internet Gambling Bill Woos with Federalism, Wash. Internet Daily, Apr. 27, 2007.  
19  See Mark A. Lemley & Phillip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 783, 804 n.106 (2007); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and 
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367, 1370-1376 (1996).  
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widespread end-user circumvention, and impose onerous compliance costs on Internet 
gambling providers.  Indeed, some commentators have argued that even if electronic 
borders can be drawn on the Internet, it would be highly unwise to draw them.20  Though 
these potential drawbacks should be taken seriously, they are not enough to outweigh the 
advantages described above.   
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part II lays out the content, costs, and 
justifications associated with the current patchwork of federal and state Internet gambling 
laws.  Part III introduces the concept of geolocation technology and shows that modern 
geolocation technologies make it possible to re-create accurate jurisdictional borders on 
the Internet.  Part IV argues that jurisdictional differentiation in Internet gambling law is 
normatively desirable, using a new legal framework in which states are the primary actors 
to frame the analysis.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: CURRENT LAW, ITS JUSTIFICATIONS, AND ASSOCIATED COSTS 
Currently, four federal statutes make up the principal Internet gambling 
prohibition regime in the United States: the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Illegal 
Gambling Business Act, and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act 
(UIGEA).21  The first three of these statutes were enacted well before the rise of Internet 
gambling, though they have collectively been interpreted to make some, and perhaps all, 
forms of online gambling illegal.22  The UIGEA, enacted in 2006, extends those laws by 
making it illegal for a bank to process, and for any Internet gambling operator to receive, 
funds in connection with gambling activities considered illegal under other federal or 
state laws.23  In this sense, the UIGEA does not itself outlaw Internet gambling.24  These 
                                                
20  See Peter S. Mennell, Regulating “Spyware”: the Limitations of State “Laboratories” 
and the Case For Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 
1363, 1415-1418 (2005). 
21  See Federal Interstate Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000); Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 
(2000); Illegal Gambling Business Act (IGBA), 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2000); Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361 - 5367 (2006); see also Kiran S. Raj, Comment: 
Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal Government Can Work with the States to Regulate 
Internet Gambling, 56 Emory L.J. 777, 783-90 (2006) (providing a brief description of each act).  
22  See, e.g., Bruce Golding, Web Poker Programmer Folds on $300M Hand, N.Y. Post, 
Dec. 17, 2008 (describing a prominent Internet gambling site founder’s $300 million forfeiture 
and guilty plea under the Wire Act). 
23  See Raj, supra note 21, at 789 (“[UIGEA] does not change significantly the current 
substantive law on Internet gambling. Rather it focuses on eliminating the financial transactions 
associated with Internet gambling.”) (citation omitted). 
24  Interestingly, many commentators have interpreted these laws to mean that while 
receiving bets from U.S.-based customers is illegal, the individual act of placing those bets is not.  
See Rotstein, supra note 5, at A1 (“The bonus for bettors is that federal and state laws generally 
only make it illegal to accept wagers, not to place them.”). 
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federal laws are chiefly enforced via Department of Justice investigations and Treasury 
Department regulations requiring banks to block transfers to Internet gambling 
providers.25   
There are several justifications for this prohibition regime, which can be divided 
into moral and economic rationales.  Prohibition advocates argue that Internet gambling 
is harmful to minors, a source of bankruptcy and addiction among adults, and a means for 
illegal money laundering.26  According to these advocates, prohibiting Internet gambling 
will cut back on each of these social ills.27  Such claims are similar to those advanced 
against gambling in general, though parties favoring prohibition frequently point out that 
the increased playing speed and immediate at-home availability of Internet gambling 
makes the potential for harm much greater.28  Other, less moralistic, justifications for 
prohibiting Internet gambling also exist.  These justifications include protection of offline 
gambling enterprises from competition and a desire to ensure that profits from gambling 
activities generate tax revenue.29  Economic rationales such as these highlight the fact 
that the U.S. gambling market is extremely profitable and growing, as legalized casino 
gambling has spread from Las Vegas in the 1930s to sixteen states in 2009.30  That 
expansion has brought with it an expansion in the relationships between casino revenues 
and state budgets.  Moreover, as the demise of Jack Abramoff’s lobbying empire showed, 
                                                
25  See Golding, supra note 22 (covering federal prosecution of a significant gambling 
executive); Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,382 (Nov. 
18, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 233; 31 C.F.R. pt. 132).  These regulations cover 
transfers to Internet gambling sites and affiliated payment processors.  
26  See Shailagh Murray & James V. Grimaldi, House Deals Blow to Internet Gaming, 
Houston Chron., July 12, 2006, at A3 (“Proponents of the crackdown said the industry, which is 
mostly based overseas, provides a front for money laundering, including by drug sellers and 
terrorist groups, while preying on children and gambling addicts.”). 
27  Id. 
28  See John M. Moran, Online . . . Where a Poker Face Doesn't Matter, Hartford Courant, 
Feb. 13, 2005, at 6.  
29  See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.  Note, however, that some incumbent U.S. 
casino operators are now arguing in favor of legalized Internet gambling, as linkages between the 
online and “brick-and-mortar” gambling economies are now creating new opportunities for profit.  
Harrah’s, the owner of a number of casinos throughout the United States and operator of the 
World Series of Poker, has recently retained lobbyists to argue in favor of legislation to legalize 
Internet gambling, since online poker rooms tend to feed players to its physical casinos.  See 
Anna Palmer, A High-Stakes Poker Game; Fighting Over Online Gaming, Roll Call, May 6, 
2009.  
30  See I. Nelson Rose & Martin D. Owens, Jr., Internet Gaming Law 80-84 (2d ed. 2009). 
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economic justifications may be the true animating force behind some outwardly morals-
based efforts to police Internet gambling.31 
Immediately following passage of UIGEA in 2006, Internet gambling advocates 
initiated efforts to amend the Act in Congress or have it overturned in the courts.  In 
2007, the Interactive Media Entertainment and Gaming Association (IMEGA), a group 
representing several Internet gambling providers, sued to enjoin enforcement of 
UIGEA.32  IMEGA challenged the law on several grounds, including claims that the law 
is void for vagueness and contrary to U.S. treaty obligations.33  Nonetheless, a district 
court upheld the Act in March 2008, and the Third Circuit affirmed that decision in 
September 2009.34   
On the legislative front, Members of Congress and an array of industry-sponsored 
lobbying organizations have sought to amend the Act to permit some forms of Internet 
gambling.35  These efforts have intensified over the last two years, during which time 
multiple hearings have been held on the proposed legislation.36  Geolocation technologies 
have played a prominent role in this legislation from the start, as proponents have sought 
to win support for the amendments by allowing states to choose their own online 
gambling regime.37  Nonetheless, as of late 2009, it seems unlikely that these proposals 
                                                
31  See Jim Galloway, Reed Denies Bid to Oust Gaming Foes; Report: Funds From 
Gambling Interests Used, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Oct. 17, 2005, at 1B.  
32  See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Gonzales, No. 07-2625, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 16903, at *3 (D.N.J. March 4, 2008), aff’d, 580 F.3d 113 (3d Cir.  2009); see also E-
Gambling Fans Won’t Fold Hand Congress Dealt, Nat’l J. Tech. Daily, Oct. 24, 2007.  
33  See Interactive Media, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16903, at *3 (describing IMEGA’s six-
count challenge to UIGEA). 
34  See Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Attorney General of the U.S., 580 F.3d 
113, 116-119 (3d Cir. 2009); Gonzales, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16903, at *37.  
35  See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 
2267, 111th Cong. (2009).  For a discussion of the content of this proposal, see infra Part IV.A.   
36  See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Regulations: Hearing Before the 
H. Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy, Trade and Tech., 110th Cong. 
(2008) (debating proposed regulations to implement the UIGEA); Can Internet Gambling be 
Effectively Regulated to Protect Consumers and the Payments System?: Hearing on H.R. 2046 
Before the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (debating whether federal legislation is an 
appropriate solution to nationwide gambling problems).  
37  See Kara Rowland, A Winning Hand with Conservatives? Poker Industry Woos CPAC, 
Wash. Times, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1; Frank Internet Gambling Bill Woos with Federalism, Wash. 
Internet Daily, Apr. 27, 2007. 
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will be enacted any time soon.38  Given this uncertainty and the failure of court 
challenges to UIGEA, the current policy landscape serves as the dominant frame for most 
of the federalism questions addressed by this Article.   
The current federal law regime does not envision significant enforcement action 
at the state level, nor does it permit choice by individual states with respect to legalization 
and regulation of Internet gambling.39  Furthermore, there is an emerging consensus that 
either the federal statutes or the Dormant Commerce Clause pre-empt most types of state 
enforcement actions.40  Despite these challenges, some states have vigorously undertaken 
efforts to prohibit Internet gambling within their own borders.  
A. Enforcement in the States: the Kentucky Domain Seizure Litigation 
Kentucky offers a leading example of state efforts to regulate Internet gambling, 
as well as the practical limitations on those efforts.  In August 2008, the Commonwealth 
of Kentucky initiated an in rem civil proceeding against 141 Internet domains associated 
with online gambling operations.41  The Commonwealth’s complaint alleged that the 
domain names constituted unlawful “gambling devices” under state law42 and sought a 
                                                
38  See Bob Barr, Get Ready to Ante up to Congress, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Sept. 21, 
2009, at 8A (“None of the bills pending in the House and Senate have moved out of the 
committees to which they were assigned, and none has been scheduled for floor action.”).  
39  See Raj, supra note 21, at 783.  
40  See, e.g., id. at 812-13 (arguing that existing federal statutes are outdated and should be 
modified to allow states to either ban or regulate Internet gambling); Olson, supra note 4, at 7-11 
(noting that state legislation over Internet gambling would likely be ineffective because of both 
the Dormant Commerce Clause and difficulties obtaining jurisdiction over out-of-state Internet 
gambling businesses); cf. Am. Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102-04 (2d Cir. 
2003) (finding that a Vermont law that could make posting materials “harmful to a minor” on the 
Internet illegal was in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause because of its likely 
extraterritorial effects); ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 194 
F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that New Mexico’s attempt to regulate internet content that is 
harmful to minors violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because “it regulates conduct 
occurring wholly outside the State of New Mexico[,]” is “an unreasonable and undue burden on 
interstate . . . commerce[,]” and “subjects interstate use of the Internet to inconsistent state 
regulations”).   
41  See Second Amended Complaint, Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 
08-CI-1409 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Ky. filed Sept. 18, 2008), available at 
http://web20.nixonpeabody.com/np20/np20wiki/PDF Library/ky_domain_complaint.pdf 
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].  
42  See Commonwealth’s Brief at 2, Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-
CI-1409 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Ky. filed Nov. 21, 2008).  Specifically, the Commonwealth invoked 
Kentucky Revised Statutes §§ 528.100 (forfeiture of gambling devices) and 500.090 (process for 
forfeiture actions).  Id.  
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seizure order directing domain registration agencies to transfer control of the domains to 
the Commonwealth.43 
Initially, the Commonwealth’s suit succeeded.  In September 2008, a Kentucky 
trial court entered a seizure order directed at the registrars for each of the defendant 
domains.44  As a result, the domains belonging to at least two online casinos temporarily 
ended up in the Commonwealth’s possession.45  None of the owners of the defendant 
domains appeared in this initial action, and it appears that most, if not all, of these owners 
were completely unaware of the matter at the time.46   
Following this initial decision, Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear issued a press 
release stating that “Kentucky loses tens of millions of dollars a year to online gambling” 
and that “[u]nlicensed Internet gambling significantly undermines and threatens 
horseracing, Kentucky's signature industry and a key tourism industry, by creating 
unregulated and untaxed competition . . . .”47  Beshear also candidly admitted that 
“Kentuckians likely spend ‘tens of millions of dollars’ on illegal Internet gambling sites 
. . . that might otherwise go to Kentucky's horse tracks, charitable events and the state 
lottery.”48  While much of the case against the domains was predicated on simple 
enforcement of state law, these statements reveal a different, and likely more honest, 
explanation.  From the perspective of public choice theory, Beshear’s statements suggest 
that states’ prime motivation in policing Internet gambling may be to protect the large 
                                                
43  See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 41, at 13-14.   
44  See Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 (Franklin Cir. Ct. 
Ky. Sept. 18, 2008) (order of seizure of domain names), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/KYseizureorder-091808.pdf.  
45  See Stephenie Steitzer, Suit Targets Online Gambling, Courier-Journal (Louisville, Ky.), 
Sept. 26, 2008, at 1B (“Internet users in Kentucky and the rest of world now are unable to access 
the two casinos, highrollerslounge.com and luckypyramidcasino.com.  The domain-name 
registration for the sites lists the Kentucky Justice Cabinet as the ‘registrant’ or operator.”).  As of 
April 2009, a WHOIS search indicates that both of these domains remain under the 
Commonwealth’s control.  A number of other sites listed in the seizure order, however, were not 
actually seized by the Commonwealth and have remained in normal operation despite the court’s 
order.   
46  Beth Musgrave, Net Gaming Sites Appeal Domain Name Seizures, Lexington Herald-
Leader, Nov. 1, 2008, at 1D.  
47  Press Release, Governor Steve Beshear, Kentucky Seizes Domain Names of Illegal 
Internet Gambling Sites (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.governor.ky.gov/pressrelease.htm?PostingGUID=%7B6930A5AD-8BF6-499C-
A4DB-70A3544BFF7D%7D.  
48  Stephanie Steitzer, Beshear Tackles Internet Gambling, Courier-Journal (Louisville, 
Ky.), Sept. 23, 2008, at 1A.  
Vol. XI The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2010 
 
50 
monopoly rents which existing casinos and racetracks provide.49  If this theory is correct, 
states might take a very different approach if they could extract similar rents from 
Internet gambling sites.   
Although domain owners did not appear in the trial court’s initial hearing, they 
and other interested parties did participate in a subsequent forfeiture hearing.50  In this 
later hearing, the domain owners and amici attacked the court’s right to exercise 
jurisdiction over the domains, objected to the Commonwealth’s construction of state law, 
and raised a number of constitutional arguments as to why the case should not proceed.51  
The trial court rejected all of these arguments in a second opinion and order.52   
                                                
49  Nearly all of the states that have waged battles against Internet gambling have substantial 
brick-and-mortar gambling operations within their borders.  New York, for instance, is home to 
numerous racetracks and tribal casinos.  Minnesota is home to several poker rooms, and 
Kentucky has its world-famous racetracks.  
50  See Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 at 2-4 (Franklin Cir. 
Ct. Ky. Oct. 16, 2008) (order amending the September 18, 2008 seizure order), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/order-Kentuckyvs141InternetDomains.pdf.  
51  See id. at 10-12, 22, 28.  
52  See id. at 39.  Specifically, the court found that the domain names constituted property 
subject to in rem proceedings, largely on the basis of a recent federal case law and the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).  See id. at 12-15, 18 (citing Kremen v. Cohen, 
337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)).  The court also found jurisdiction over 
the domains was proper, noting that the “Domain Names transport the virtual premises of an 
Internet gambling casino inside the houses of Kentucky residents” and that such domains 
“perform a critical role in creating and maintaining [a] connection by way of the various 
interfaces to transact a game or play.”  Id. at 15-22 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(C)(i)-(ii)).  
Further, the court cited Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., Inc., 293 F.3d 506, 510 (D.C. Cir. 
2002), for the proposition that “cyberspace is not some mystical incantation capable of warding 
off the jurisdiction of courts built from bricks and mortar.” Id. at 22. 
      Interestingly, the court also held that poker constitutes unlawful gambling under KRS 
§ 528.010(3).  See Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 at 25-26 
(Franklin Cir. Ct. Ky. Oct. 16, 2008) (order amending the September 18, 2008 seizure order), 
available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/order-
Kentuckyvs141InternetDomains.pdf.  This decision conflicts with several recent holdings in other 
jurisdictions, which have concluded that poker is a game of skill.  See Schuyler Kropf, Poker 
Players Declared Guilty, The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC), Feb. 20, 2009, at B1 (describing 
a South Carolina case wherein a trial judge found “overwhelming” evidence that poker is a game 
of skill rather than pure gambling based on chance); Definition Clears Man of Gambling 
Charges, Fort Collins Coloradoan, http://www.9news.com/rss/article.aspx?storyid=108829 (Feb. 
3, 2009) (describing a Colorado case in which a man accused of illegal gambling was acquitted 
under a definition of illegal gambling that exempted “bona fide contests of skill”); Chuck Blount, 
Poker Deemed Game of Skill in Pennsylvania, San Antonio Express-News, Jan. 22, 2009, at 3D 
(noting a Pennsylvania ruling that poker is “a game of skill [not] subject to . . . state gambling 
laws.”).   
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The court’s second opinion and order tackled the question of whether states 
should police Internet gambling head-on.  The trial judge wrote that the domain owners’ 
argument that “judicial interference of the Internet will create havoc” is a “doomsday 
argument” which “does not ruffle the Court”; indeed, the order states that “[t]he Internet . 
. . is still not above the law, whether on an international or municipal level.”53  Despite 
the court’s profession of indifference towards these potentially serious collateral effects, 
it modified the seizure to mitigate any effects outside of Kentucky.  Specifically, the 
court altered its order to permit gambling sites to retain their domains so long as they 
installed software that would deny access to users within Kentucky.54  Thus, the court 
acknowledged that geolocation technologies might offer a viable alternative to other 
enforcement measures, such as seizure of the offending domains.  In this regard, the 
court’s order appears to be the first example of a U.S. court invoking geolocation 
technologies as a potential solution to Internet gambling problems.  
Following this turn of events, domain owners sought to block enforcement of the 
trial court’s seizure order.55  In January 2009, the Kentucky Court of Appeals granted the 
domain owners’ petition, holding that domain names do not fall within the meaning of 
“gambling device” set forth in KRS section 528.100.56  Even if the Kentucky Supreme 
Court reverses the court of appeals on this question, or if the state legislature amends 
section 528.100 to cover Internet domains, Kentucky’s seizure effort will still likely fail 
as an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce under the Dormant Commerce Clause.57   
                                                
53  See Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-CI-1409 at 39 (Franklin Cir. 
Ct. Ky. Oct. 16, 2008) (order amending the September 18, 2008 seizure order), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/order-Kentuckyvs141InternetDomains.pdf.  
54  Id. at 39-40.  The order did condition this option on approval of such measures by the 
court. Id.  
55  See Petition for Writ of Prohibition of Vicsbingo.com and Interactive Gaming Council at 
2, Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Wingate, No. 08-CI-01409, (Ky. Ct. App. 
filed Oct. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/writpetition.pdf.  The Court of Appeals 
granted a stay of the trial court’s seizure order pending resolution of the appeal. See Interactive 
Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Wingate, No. 08-CI-01409, at 3-4 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov 14, 
2008) (order granting defendants’ motion for a stay), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/iMEGA--COA Order--11-14-08-1.pdf. 
56  See Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Wingate, No. 08-CI-01409, at 8 
(Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009) (order granting petition for writ of prohibition), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/kentuckyorder-final.pdf.  The 
Commonwealth has appealed this decision to the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Notice of Appeal 
to Kentucky Supreme Court, Interactive Media Entm’t and Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Hon. Thomas 
D. Wingate, , Franklin Cir. Ct., No. 08-CI-01409 (Ky. Ct. App. filed Jan. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/Notice%20of%20Appeal.pdf. 
57  See, e.g., Olson, supra note 4, at 9 (concluding, after a detailed analysis, that the 
Dormant Commerce Clause likely prevents states from regulating Internet gambling within their 
borders); cf. Am. Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102-04 (2d Cir. 2003) 
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Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, states are prohibited from passing 
legislation that “discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 
‘impedes free private trade in the national marketplace.’”58  In the Internet context, state 
laws tend to run afoul of this prohibition in one of two ways—either by regulating a 
market sector that is subject only to federal control due to its interstate nature, or by 
regulating conduct that occurs wholly within other states’ borders.59  State regulation of 
Internet gambling raises both of these problems, since it involves the same online market 
that was held to be an exclusive “national preserve” in American Libraries Ass’n v. 
Pataki,60 and since enforcement of such regulations would effectively “project[] [the 
state’s] law into other states.”61  To illustrate this point, imagine that Kentucky prevailed 
in its suit, resulting in seizure and deactivation of all 141 domains.  That outcome would 
not only seriously undermine federal legislation aimed at legalizing some forms of 
Internet gambling,62 it would also make it impossible for consumers in Nevada to gamble 
on sites using the seized domains, even if Nevada law permitted them to do so.  As a 
result, commentators have reached a consensus that state regulation of Internet gambling 
violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.63 
Kentucky’s experience with Internet gambling regulation is far from unique.  As a 
matter of constitutional law, the Dormant Commerce Clause poses the same limitations 
on all fifty states.  That limitation has caused states to explore creative, though often 
ineffective, indirect measures to regulate Internet gambling, such as Kentucky’s state law 
claims or Minnesota’s recent effort to force Internet service providers to block access to 
                                                
(concluding that a Vermont statute criminalizing the transfer of sexually explicit materials to 
children violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as applied to out-of-state operators of internet 
Web sites); ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1149 
(10th Cir. 1999) (deciding that a New Mexico provision banning communication of indecent 
materials to minors violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as applied to Internet users and 
content providers). 
58  General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 
447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980) (citations omitted)). 
59  See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); cf. Am. 
Booksellers Foundation v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102-04 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the Internet’s 
wide geographic reach causes state regulation to be impracticable).  
60  969 F. Supp. at 183.  For more detail on this point, see infra Part III.B.  
61  Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 177.   
62  See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 
2267, 111th Cong. (2009); Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 
2046, 110th Cong. § 5387 (2007). 
63  See Olson, supra note 4, at 9 (concluding after a detailed analysis, that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause likely prevents states from regulating Internet gambling within their borders).   
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gambling sites.64  While some states have achieved limited success in prosecuting 
individual gaming sites or blocking payment processing,65 on the whole Internet 
gambling has thrived in the United States in spite of state efforts to the contrary.66  
Kentucky’s motivations for seeking to prohibit Internet gambling are also typical.  
Kentucky, like many other states, earns significant revenue from its casinos.67  Thus, its 
efforts to block Internet gambling, like those of other states that allow brick and mortar 
gambling, can be characterized as an effort to protect in-state casino revenue streams 
from online competition.68  Though some opponents of Internet gambling focus more on 
                                                
64  See Peter Svensson, Novel Effort in Minnesota Seeks ISP Gambling Block, ABC News, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=7461125 (Apr. 29, 2009).  
65  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997) (upholding jurisdiction over out-of-state Internet gambling provider); Reidenberg, supra 
note 10, at 1960 (noting New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer’s successful effort to get banks 
to voluntarily cease processing transfers to Internet gambling providers).  
66  See Tony Batt, Chances Seem Slim for Passing Net Betting Ban, Las Vegas Review-
Journal, Aug. 28, 2006, at 1D (“[Internet gambling] has gone from 30 offshore Web sites taking 
in $30 million in bets in 1996 to a $12 billion industry with more than 2,300 Web sites this 
year.”).  
67  See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.  
68  Nevada, the Mecca of brick-and-mortar casino gambling in the United States, merits 
additional discussion in light of this general theory.  Due to the significant revenue Nevada gains 
through traditional casino gambling, one might expect the state to oppose Internet gambling more 
vigorously than other states.  Yet Nevada has done just the opposite, as it has passed legislation 
that moves the state towards legalized Internet gambling if and when federal law allows.  See 
infra note 91 and accompanying text.   
 While Nevada’s position may at first seem to show that states are not seeking to protect 
in-state casino income through Internet gambling legislation, the state’s position is actually 
consistent with the theory advocated above for two reasons.  First, major Las Vegas casino 
operators, such as Harrah’s Entertainment, have calculated that Internet gambling helps fuel their 
brick-and-mortar businesses.  Online poker sites, for instance, have contributed to a major 
increase in the value and popularity of Harrah’s annual World Series of Poker event.  See supra 
note 29.  While Las Vegas-based casinos may experience a net benefit from Internet gambling 
due to their status as tourist destinations, other, less-glitzy gambling establishments (e.g., those 
which rely primarily on local customers, as opposed to tourists) may not reap similar Internet-
based rewards.  For customers of the latter class of casinos, Internet gambling may be less of a 
complementary good and more of a substitute.   
 Second, state sentiment against Internet gambling may be waning.  Until recently, major 
casino operators strongly opposed legalization of Internet gambling.  Now, those same companies 
are beginning to embrace it.  See Alan Schmadtke, Bill Seeks to Legalize Internet Wagering, 
Orlando Sentinel, May 8, 2007, at D1 (“Casinos were vehemently opposed to Internet gambling a 
decade ago but since have relaxed their stance as revenue possibilities emerged for them.”).  As 
casino operators’ views change, so too may those of state governments.  The fact that Nevada has 
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morality, protection of children, or similar ends,69 the powerful economic motivations 
described above suggest that states could change their stance towards Internet gambling if 
new revenue opportunities were to arise.   
B. The Costs of State and Federal Regulation 
For all its benefits, whether moral or economic, the current prohibition regime 
also carries tremendous direct and indirect costs.  To date, prohibition of Internet 
gambling has directly resulted in imposition of large sanctions by the WTO, with the 
potential for additional sanctions looming on the horizon.70  The system also prevents 
states willing to embrace Internet gambling from receiving taxes or licensing fees at a 
time when Internet gambling is booming and state budgets are routinely in the red.71  
1. Direct Costs: WTO Sanctions 
As a signatory to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),72 the 
United States is obligated to open up its markets to competition from overseas.  Under the 
treaty, member nations may close off particular market sectors from such competition for 
valid moral reasons.73  Alternatively, nations may also withdraw entire market segments 
from treaty coverage altogether.74  When nations choose the latter route, they must 
satisfactorily compensate other member nations injured by the withdrawal or submit to 
binding arbitration.75  In cases where a signatory nation blocks foreign access to a market 
                                                
passed legislation that would permit some Internet gambling may simply reflect the fact that its 
legislature is more in tune with casino operators’ views than other state legislatures.   
69  See Steitzer, supra note 48, at 1A.  
70  See D. Ravi Kanth, U.S. Offers Compensation to India on Internet Gambling, Business 
Standard, Dec. 18, 2007, at 2 (describing potential claims against the U.S. by Japan, Canada, 
Australia, Costa Rica, Macau, and others).  
71  See, e.g., States Need Deep Cutbacks, Buffalo News (New York), Feb. 23, 2009, at A8 
(discussing four states facing budget shortages).  
72  General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1168 
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].  
73  Id. at art. XIV(a) (permitting exceptions “necessary to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order”).  
74  See id. at art. XXI § 1(a).   
75  Id. at art. XXI §§ 2-4.  
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without having taken either of these courses of action, injured foreign nations may appeal 
to the WTO for damages.76  
In 2005, the WTO found that U.S. federal and state gambling laws unfairly 
discriminated against foreign Internet gambling operators.77  The United States invoked 
the GATS moral exception clause in defense of these laws, but the WTO panel rejected 
that argument because U.S. law permits a wide array of domestic gambling services, 
including gambling across state lines.78  If the United States truly had a moral objection 
to gambling, such laws would never be on the books.  As a result, in 2007 a WTO panel 
awarded Antigua up to $21 million in annual trade sanctions from the United States.79  
Other WTO members, including Japan, Canada, and the E.U., followed by filing similar 
WTO claims.  In response, the United States announced that it was withdrawing its 
domestic gambling services market from WTO jurisdiction entirely.80  Under GATS, this 
move required the United States to negotiate agreements or else proceed to arbitration 
with affected WTO members to compensate them for revenues lost as a result of the 
removal.81   
After extensive negotiations, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and 
the E.U. reached such a settlement in December 2007.82  However, the USTR kept the 
settlement terms confidential.83  The USTR denied a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request for the settlement terms on national security grounds.84  Ultimately, watchdog 
                                                
76  See Julia Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade 
Organization, 23 B.U. Int’l L.J. 215, 270-74 (2005).  
77  See Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, P 1.2, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).  
78  See Interstate Horse Racing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000) (permitting interstate 
wagers on horse races).  
79  See Alan M. Field, High Stakes at the WTO; Ruling in Internet Gambling Dispute Could 
Have Far-Reaching Impact, J. of Comm., Jan. 14, 2008, at 32.  These sanctions are not money 
damages, but rather come in the form of trade preferences such as the right to sell U.S. 
copyrighted material without paying royalties to the copyright owners.  Id.  
80  See EU out of U.S. Online Gambling Market, L.A. Times, Dec. 18, 2007, at C7. 
81  See GATS at art. XXI § 3.   
82  See Joint Letter from the United States of America and the European Communities 
pursuant to paragraph 5 of the procedures for the implementation of Article XXI of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)(S/L/80), Dec. 17, 2007.  Notably, this agreement has 
not gone into effect as of April 2009. See Wallach Decl., infra note 86, at 7.  
83  See Press Release, Public Citizen, Bush Administration Illegally Withholding Terms of 
Deal That Binds New Sectors of U.S. Economy to WTO Authority, 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2658, May 19, 2008. 
84  See id. 
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group Public Citizen and journalist Ed Brayton compelled disclosure of the settlement via 
litigation in November 2008.85   
The U.S.-E.U. settlement is opaquely worded and does not include a clear dollar 
value, unlike the judgment secured by Antigua.86  Nonetheless, the settlement is 
potentially massive, with estimates running into the billions of dollars.87  It dramatically 
expands foreign access to several sectors of the U.S. economy: storage and warehouse 
services, research and development, postal and courier services, and technical testing and 
analysis.88  The storage component has proven to be the most controversial as it opens up 
the U.S. market for storage of “liquids, gases, gasoline, oils, and chemicals,” including 
highly sensitive liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals and tank farms containing other types 
of potentially hazardous substances.  The National Conference of State Legislatures has 
forcefully opposed this change, mainly on security grounds.89  Further, the settlement’s 
research and development terms suggest that some current U.S. tax preferences and 
subsidies for domestic industries may no longer be legal under GATS.90   
The Antigua judgment and the U.S.-E.U. settlement described above both arose 
directly as a consequence of U.S. laws prohibiting Internet gambling.  Some states, such 
as Kentucky, strongly support prohibition of Internet gambling, while others, such as 
Nevada, have enacted laws explicitly allowing it.91  There is little evidence that states 
have considered the international trade dimension in arriving at their stance on the issue.  
Moreover, the nation as a whole, rather than only the anti-gambling states, shoulders the 
burden of these significant costs—giving rise to a classic free rider problem.   
                                                
85  See Defendant’s Notice of Release of Document, Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, No. 08-0855 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 26, 2008).   
86  See Decl. of Lori Wallach, Brayton v. USTR, No. 08-0855 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 9, 2009) 
(noting that it took two months to “decod[e]” the settlement and that the settlement is 
“indecipherable to the average reader”) [hereinafter Wallach Decl.].  
87  See Letter from Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Fin. Servs. Comm., to the 
U.S. Trade Representative (Mar. 14, 2008) (“[S]ome trade experts [have] estimated that the trade 
concessions could cost the United States many billions of dollars in compensation.”); E-mail from 
Ed Brayton, Plaintiff in Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, to Kevin King (Feb. 
28, 2009, 10:07 CST) (on file with author) (“[T]here’s no way to measure the possible benefit to 
the E.U. but it almost certainly has to dwarf the Antigua settlement.”).  
88  See Wallach Decl. at 8-9.  
89  Id. at 10-11.  
90  Id. at 11-15.  
91  See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 463.750 (2009); Ed Vogel, Bill Advancing Internet Gambling 
Signed by Guinn, Las Vegas Review-Journal, June 15, 2001, at 10A.  
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2. Indirect Costs: Lost Tax Revenues and Licensing Fees 
The current prohibition regime also imposes large indirect costs on states in the 
form of lost tax revenues and lost licensing fees.  Online casinos, card rooms, and sports 
books generate billions of dollars in revenue from U.S.-based customers each year but 
pay no U.S. taxes.92  Assuming an even distribution of gambling activity throughout the 
U.S. population and tax rates consistent with state taxation of traditional brick-and-mortar 
casinos, a state like Illinois could theoretically generate $30 million or more in annual tax 
revenue.93  Indeed, some recent estimates have suggested that legalizing and regulating 
online gambling could generate as much as $4 billion per year nationally.94  While 
legalized gambling over the Internet would carry the potential for more social ills such as 
addiction, bankruptcy, and underage gambling,95 the staggering amounts of revenue that 
could be generated by states favoring legalization simply cannot be ignored.  
III. GEOLOCATION TECHNOLOGIES: RECONSTRUCTING JURISDICTIONAL BORDERS ON THE 
INTERNET 
The Internet’s architecture naturally resists classification of users according to 
geographic or legal jurisdiction.  This design feature makes it extremely difficult for one 
state to enforce its Internet gambling laws without compromising the prerogatives of 
other states.  For example, if Kentucky had succeeded in seizing the 141 gambling 
domains, it would have effectively imposed its law on citizens in each of the other forty-
nine states as well as other countries.  In this manner, the Internet’s architecture seems to 
force states to choose between two equally unpalatable options: violating the Dormant 
Commerce Clause or forgoing enforcement entirely.96     
Advances in geolocation technology promise to radically alter that picture by 
making it possible to cheaply and effectively re-create jurisdictional borders on the 
                                                
92  See Raj, supra note 21, at 799-802.  
93  According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2007 estimates, Illinois has 12,852,548 
residents—about 4.6% of the nation’s population.  See Illinois QuickFacts from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17000.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).  Illinois’ 
pro-rata share of the $7.2 billion spent annually on Internet gambling by U.S. consumers equals 
over $330 million.  See Cholodofsky, supra note 7.   
94  See Stephen A. Murphy, Report Estimates Online Gambling Could Bring in $42 Billion, 
Card Player Magazine, Nov. 3, 2009, available at http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-news/7878-
report-estimates-online-gambling-could-bring-in-42-billion; Rowland, supra note 37, at A1; 
Aoife McCarthy, Online Gambling Draws Opposition, Politico, 
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17159A41-3048-5C12-0059B69C307BDBAD (Nov. 
6, 2007).  
95  See Raj, supra note 21, at 791-99; see also Murray & Grimaldi, supra note 26, at A3.  
96  Cf. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing 
the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to state regulation of the Internet).   
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Internet.   As a result, geolocation technologies may be poised to play the role of the 
sword in slicing through the heretofore impenetrable Internet gambling Gordian knot.  
This Part introduces the concept of geolocation on the Internet, traces developments in 
the technology in recent years, and explores the ramifications of these architectural 
developments for Internet gambling law.   
A. Geolocation Technologies Defined 
Geolocation technologies identify an Internet end-user’s physical location by an 
automated means.  The most sophisticated and commonly-deployed approach to this 
process relies on a user’s IP address to make the geographical match.97  One leading 
article explains the process as follows:  
As the access-seeker enters the appropriate Uniform Resource Locator 
(“URL”) into his/her browser, or clicks on the appropriate hyperlink, an 
access-request is sent to the server operating the requested Web site. As 
the server receives the access-request, it, in turn, sends a location request 
(i.e., forwards the access-seeker's Internet Protocol (“IP”) address) to the 
provider of the geo-location service. The provider of the geo-location 
service has gathered information about the IP addresses in use, and built 
up a database of geo-location information. Based on the information in 
this database, the provider of the geo-location service gives the Web site 
server an educated guess as to the access-seeker's location. Armed with 
this information, the Web server can provide the access-seeker with the 
information deemed suitable . . . .98 
Other, less sophisticated geolocation technologies query an end-user’s browser 
settings such as time zone and language to determine the user’s physical location.99  
Currently, a wide range of companies use geolocation tools to serve targeted advertising 
on Web sites,100 to restrict access to individuals from undesirable locations,101 and to 
provide content in a user’s native language.102  
                                                
97  See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-location Technologies and Other Means of Placing 
Borders on the ‘Borderless' Internet, 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 101, 109-10 (2004). 
98  Id. at 110.  
99  Id. at 120-21.  
100  Id. at 102; see also Lemley & Weiser, supra note 19, at 803-05; Reidenberg, supra note 
10, at 1952, 1961; Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders, Legal Aff. Jan.-Feb. 2006 40, 
at 43.  
101  For example, Party Poker, formerly the most successful online poker site in the U.S., 
uses IP-based geolocation tools to block U.S. customers from accessing its servers in an effort to 
avoid liability under the Wire Act.  Other major industry players have also used geolocation tools 
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Most forms of sophisticated, IP-based geolocation technology are extremely 
accurate.  Experts have estimated accuracy rates of between 85 and 98 percent at the state 
level and over 99 percent at the national level.103  The level of accuracy necessarily 
depends on the quality of the data used by the geolocation provider (Akamai, BlackEdge, 
Quova, etc.),104 the context in which a content provider is operating,105 and the prevailing 
Internet architecture.106  To some extent, these limitations reflect the fledgling nature of 
the geolocation industry, as most development in that market has taken place in recent 
years.107  Therefore, geolocation technologies will likely become more accurate in the 
future.   
B. A Brief History of Geolocation and the Law 
Just over a decade ago, the conventional wisdom was that geographic location 
detection on the Internet was impossible.  In American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, a 
widely-cited 1997 district court case, the court stated “[t]he Internet is wholly insensitive 
to geographic distinctions.  In almost every case, users of the Internet neither know nor 
care about the physical location of the Internet resources they access.  Internet protocols 
were designed to ignore rather than document geographic location . . . .”108  Because it 
                                                
in the past for similar purposes.  See Gary Rotstein, Internet Gambling May Be Illegal but It's Not 
Going Away, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 11, 2006, at A13 (“MGM Mirage operated an 
interactive Web site from the Isle of Man . . . in 2001-03, attempting to show it could bar play by 
users who were . . . based in places that did not permit Internet gambling, including the [U.S.]”).  
102  Svantesson, supra note 97, at 120.  For example, Google automatically tailors its search 
page to the end-user’s home country and language.  
103  See PricewaterhouseCoopers Completes Annual Audit of Quova IP Geolocation Data, 
Marketwire, Apr. 14, 2009; Internet Gambling Safeguards, Social Ills Dominate Hearing, 
Washington Internet Daily, June 11, 2007.  
104  Svantesson, supra note 97, at 111-13.  
105  For example, IP-based geolocation will work much more effectively in densely 
populated, industrialized nations such as the U.S. or South Korea, and much less effectively in 
developing nations with highly decentralized and poorly documented Internet infrastructures.  See 
id. at 112-13.  
106  See id. at 118-19 (discussing the relative ease of IP-based geolocation under both the 
IPv4 and IPv6 frameworks).  
107  See id. at 101-02.  
108  969 F. Supp. 160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208 
(1st Cir. 2009) (“Simply put, it is impossible to say with any certainty that a given packet will 
take the shortest route in distance; the routers search for the shortest route in time. Further 
compounding this problem, the network itself was not established with state boundaries in mind, 
nor does it even recognize them. ‘The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions.’”).  
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was impossible to distinguish between users in different jurisdictions, the court held that 
a New York law prohibiting various forms of online pornography violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.109  In so holding, the court reasoned that  
The unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a single 
actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright 
inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and 
possibly was unaware were being accessed.  Typically, states’ 
jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, however, is a 
virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.110 
In this regard, the technical reality of the day dictated the legal result111—thus 
illustrating Lawrence Lessig’s axiom that “code is law.” 112   
Other courts have taken a similar approach.  In ACLU v. Reno, a case involving 
the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, a federal district court 
concluded that “there is no technologically feasible way for an Internet speaker to limit 
the geographical scope of his speech (even if he wanted to), or to implement a system for 
                                                
109  Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84.  Though some courts have begun to carve 
out exceptions, see Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 512 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1101 (S.D. Ohio 2007), the case remains good law for its core proposition that state-based 
regulation of the Internet violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Specifically, the New York 
law would have criminalized knowingly transmitting images which “in whole or in part, 
depict[ed] actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse” that were 
“harmful to minors” via any “computer communication system allowing the input, output, 
examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another . . 
. .”  Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F.Supp. at 163.  While the law provided a number of affirmative 
defenses, these defenses required a party to take particular filtering or verification measures, and 
thus amounted to a form of indirect regulation.  See id. at 163-64.  More importantly, the law did 
not “import any restriction that the criminal communication must take place entirely within the 
State of New York.”  Id. at 169.  Thus, the court reasoned, “the Act applies to any 
communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits within the prohibition and over which New York 
has the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 169-70.  
110  Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 168-69.  
111  Though she was focusing on the potential for age identification rather than geographic 
identification, Justice O’Connor expressed a similar sentiment in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
891 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice O’Connor wrote that 
“cyberspace still remains largely unzoned—and unzoneable,” and that this technological 
shortcoming doomed what would otherwise be a valid regulation.  Id.  Justice O’Connor also 
remarked that “prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising,” hinting that a 
change in technological capability could dictate a substantive change in the law as well.  Id.  
112  Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 6 (1999).  
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screening the locale of incoming requests.”113  Just a few years later, the Third Circuit 
found the lack of an effective geographic screening mechanism fatal to the 
constitutionality of another online speech measure, the Child Online Protection Act 
(COPA).114  Reflecting the state of the Internet at the time, the court stated that “Web 
publishers are without any means to limit access to their sites based on the geographic 
location of particular Internet users.  As soon as information is published on a Web site, it 
is accessible to all other Web visitors.”115  Since publishers could not “restrict access to 
their site based on the geographic locale of the Internet user visiting their site,” the Third 
Circuit reasoned that sites would be unconstitutionally forced to either “comply with the 
regulation imposed by the State with the most stringent standard or entirely forego 
Internet communication . . . .”116   
Litigation involving several state law variants of COPA elicited similar views 
regarding online jurisdictional differentiation from the courts.  In assessing a New 
Mexico child protection measure, one district court found that “[i]t is impossible for 
speakers [on] the World Wide Web to determine the geographic location of persons who 
access their speech” and that “speakers have no way to prevent speech communicated by 
. . . the World Wide Web from reaching persons residing in the State of New Mexico.”117  
A district court in Michigan reached largely the same result one year later in Cyberspace 
Communications, Inc. v. Engler.118  There, the court matter-of-factly stated that “[t]he 
majority of Internet addresses contain no geographic indicators.”119  The perceived 
inability to screen Internet users by jurisdiction also played a key role in the Second 
Circuit’s decision in American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean—a case in which the 
court enjoined enforcement of a Vermont child protection law on Dormant Commerce 
Clause grounds.120  Key to the Second Circuit’s analysis was the fact that “the Internet 
does not recognize geographic boundaries,” thus making it “difficult, if not impossible, 
                                                
113  ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 878 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court declared that Internet sites are “located in no particular geographical 
location.”  Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997).   
114  ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162,166 (2000) (enjoining enforcement of 47 U.S.C. § 231 
(2000)), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
115  Id. at 175.   
116  Id. at 176 (internal quotations omitted).   
117  ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp.2d 1029, 1032 (D.N.M. 1998), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th 
Cir. 1999).   
118  55 F. Supp.2d 737, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d and remanded, 238 F.3d 420 (6th 
Cir. 2000), summary judgment and injunction granted on remand, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001).   
119  Id. at 744.   
120  342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003).   
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for a state to regulate internet activities without projecting its legislation into other 
States.”121   
As recently as 2004, federal courts have determined that geolocation techniques 
were insufficiently accurate for legal purposes.  For example, in Sony Music 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Does, Judge Denny Chin of the Southern District of New York 
expressed skepticism that then state-of-the-art geolocation tools could do anything more 
than establish the “likelihood” that the John Doe defendants were located outside of the 
state.122  A second 2004 district opinion in United States v. Wagers, however, presaged 
the coming revolution in geolocation technology in its conclusion that “[W]eb IP 
addresses do not directly reflect the geographic street address of the office, residence, or 
building from which an individual accesses . . . the Internet.”123  The Ninth Circuit 
illustrated the legal significance of the indirect geolocation measures referenced in 
Wagers when it openly suggested in 2006 that Yahoo! not only had the means to screen 
content by jurisdiction, but was in fact doing so to comply with a French court order.124     
Much has changed since American Library Ass’n was decided in 1997.  Not only 
are geolocation technologies now widely available, they have been characterized as 
“accurate enough for legal purposes.”125  As illustrated in the Kentucky litigation, courts 
have begun to take judicial notice of this degree of accuracy in holding that Web site 
operators have both the means and the duty to filter content according to local laws.126  
Other U.S. courts have also recently taken a similar approach to geolocation 
technologies.127  These decisions build on a trend set in motion by a seminal French case 
decided in 2000 regarding display of Nazi paraphernalia on various Web pages hosted by 
                                                
121  Id. at 103 (internal quotations omitted).   
122  326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).    
123  339 F. Supp. 3d 934, 940 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
124  Cf. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (“Yahoo! contends that restricting access by French Internet users in a manner sufficient to 
satisfy the French court would in some unspecified fashion require Yahoo! simultaneously to 
restrict access by Internet users in the United States. This may or may not be true. It is almost 
certainly not true if Yahoo! is now complying ‘in large measure’ with the French court's orders . . 
. .”). 
125  Svantesson, supra note 97, at 101; see also Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders On, Or 
Border Around-The Future of the Internet, 16 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 343, 356 (2006) [hereinafter 
Borders].  
126  Recall that the trial court allowed gambling sites to retain their domain names if they 
blocked access to users based in Kentucky.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
127  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F.Supp.2d 946, 960 (N.D. Cal. 
2006); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, No. 00-121, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11670 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2000). 
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Yahoo!.128  As the technology continues to mature, courts, legislatures, and agencies will 
increasingly look to geolocation as a means to force Internet content providers to comply 
with local laws.  In this regard, geolocation technology may have developed sufficient 
commercial and legal momentum as to destroy the “borderless” character of the Internet 
and usher in a new era in which online content is jurisdictionally differentiated to almost 
the same extent as that in the offline world.129  
For evidence of that trend, one need look no further than the leading proposal to 
reform federal Internet gambling law, the Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer 
Protection, and Enforcement Act (IGRCPEA).130  The Act’s central feature and raison 
d’être is the legalization of Internet gambling services provided by federally-licensed 
operators.  Although the Act would theoretically legalize Internet gambling throughout 
the United States, it does grant individual states the right to opt out of some or all of the 
new regulatory regime.131  To give force to those state choices, the Act would require 
gambling sites to use geolocation technologies “to ensure that the individual placing a bet 
or wager is physically located in a jurisdiction that permits Internet gambling at the time 
the bet or wager is placed.”132  Importantly, IGRCPEA imposes liability on licensed 
Internet gambling operators only when they “knowingly” accept wagers from customers 
in jurisdictions where online gambling is illegal,133 apparently barring actions for 
negligence by state attorneys general and immunizing operators that utilize state-of-the-
art geolocation systems.   
IV. IS A JURISDICTIONALLY DIFFERENTIATED INTERNET GAMBLING REGIME DESIRABLE? 
As demonstrated in Part III, geolocation technologies are now widely available, 
extremely accurate, and increasingly utilized by legal actors to force online enterprises to 
                                                
128  See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 
Nov. 20, 2000 (Fr.).  For a discussion of this case and its implications for jurisdictional 
differentiation on the Internet, see Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1201-05; Borders, supra note 125, at 356-
57; Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 42; Alex van Leeuwen, Geo-targeting on IP Address: 
Pinpointing Geolocation of Internet Users, Geo Informatics (July/Aug. 2001).  
129  Cf. Svantesson, supra note 97, at 358.  
130  See Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 
2267, 111th Cong. (2009); Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 
2046, 110th Cong. § 5387 (2007). 
131  H.R. 2046 § 5385(a).  
132  H.R. 2046 § 5383(g)(2).  For a discussion of the specific roles envisioned for geolocation 
in implementing the Act, see Can Internet Gambling Be Effectively Regulated to Protect 
Consumers and the Payments System? Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) 
[hereinafter Internet Gambling Hearing].  
133  See H.R. 2046 § 5385(c)(2).  
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comply with local laws.134  While it is clear that geolocation technologies will play a role 
in future regulation of Internet gambling in the United States—whether legalized or not—
it is unclear how pervasive that role will ultimately be.  To frame that discussion, this Part 
introduces a hypothetical framework for the regulation of Internet gambling.  The 
proposed framework uses geolocation technologies to re-create state jurisdictional 
borders on the Internet, while addressing Commerce Clause issues through federal 
legislation that provides states with control over substantive policy decisions.  This Part 
argues that such a framework is normatively desirable because it is more democratic, 
more effective, and more efficient than the current regime.  Arguments against 
jurisdictional differentiation based on circumvention, cost, and harm to the Internet’s 
open nature fail to offset these advantages.   
A. Hypothetical Federal-State Framework Governing Internet Gambling 
Imagine a federal law that includes the following five provisions.  First, all 
Internet gambling operators doing business in the United States must implement state-of-
the-art geolocation technologies, as well as measures designed to defeat end-user 
circumvention of those technologies.  A competent federal agency shall license operators 
meeting that requirement to do business in the United States, and shall also ensure 
ongoing compliance.  Second, the responsible federal agency shall develop two tiers of 
licenses for operators: one covering all classes of gambling activities found in U.S. brick-
and-mortar casinos, and one covering only games where skill is the primary long-term 
determinant, such as poker.135  Third, individual states may elect to legalize either tier of 
Internet gambling established by the agency (or, as a third option, no gambling at all)—
with all other forms of state-based Internet gambling regulation expressly pre-empted.  
Fourth, Internet gambling operators may not knowingly or recklessly serve customers in 
states that have not elected either of the tiers described above.  Such states shall have a 
private right of action to enforce this provision in any manner that does not undermine 
the framework as a whole or the rights of any other state.  Fifth, a uniform and exclusive 
federal tax on all net receipts by licensed Internet gambling operators shall be imposed.  
Proceeds of this tax shall be apportioned on a per capita basis among the states electing 
either of the two tiers of legalized Internet gambling.  The responsible agency shall 
                                                
134  See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.  
135  See Rose & Owens, Jr., supra note 30, at 17-23.  Rose and Owens cite several cases, 
including State ex rel. Schillberg v. Barnett, 488 P.2d 255 (Wash. 1971), for the proposition that 
outcomes in poker games, unlike lotteries or other forms of gambling, are primarily determined 
by skill.  Id.  In addition, one can argue, as experts supplied by the Poker Players’ Alliance have 
in recent court cases, that poker is primarily a game of skill because knowledgeable players can 
both determine and manipulate the expected value of most bets.  If a player consistently places 
wagers when the expected value of a wager is greater than zero and avoids doing so when the 
expected value is less than zero, then in the long run the player will turn a profit—even if in the 
short run those decisions may often produce a loss.  See supra note 52 (describing recent cases in 
which courts have accepted this reasoning).   
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coordinate with the United States Trade Representative to ensure that states electing to 
prohibit Internet gambling primarily bear the direct costs resulting from such laws.     
This hypothetical federal-state regulatory framework closely mirrors the 
IGRCPEA proposal currently under consideration in Congress.  There are several 
important areas in which it differs, however.  Whereas IGRCPEA is relatively lax in 
requiring only “appropriate” measures to identify a customer’s location and immunizes 
operators taking such measures so long as they do not “knowingly” accept illegal 
wagers,136 the proposal above mandates the strongest form of geolocation technology 
currently available, requires reasonable anti-circumvention efforts,137 and attaches 
liability for reckless as well as knowing violations.  In taking a slightly more prescriptive 
course, the proposal above avoids the very real pitfall of compliance in name only, as 
many less sophisticated forms of geolocation are much less than 100% accurate and 
offshore operators may be tempted to build negligence into their customer verification 
processes if only knowing violations are actionable.   
Further, the proposal above departs from IGRCPEA in providing three basic 
choices for states: full legalization, partial legalization, or none at all.  IGRCPEA, on the 
other hand, appears to open the door to an infinite array of differing state laws by 
authorizing individual states to allow or prohibit “any particular types of gambling 
activities.”138  The hypothetical framework also promotes greater efficiency by imposing 
a single federal tax on Internet gambling proceeds, rather than allowing each state to set 
its own rate structure, as in IGRCPEA.139  Taking this approach one step further, the 
framework above apportions the direct costs of the overall system among the states in a 
manner consistent with their individual choices, while IGRCPEA is silent on this 
important issue.  
The hypothetical framework described above is obviously only one configuration 
among a sea of possible alternatives.  Yet this example serves as a useful jumping-off 
point for the normative discussion below for three reasons.  To begin with, the 
hypothetical framework relies heavily on geolocation to create digital borders and places 
a great deal of weight on state law choices within those borders—thus bringing 
jurisdictional differentiation to the fore.  Additionally, the framework closely tracks the 
contours of the legislative proposal most likely to be enacted into law in the near future—
thus ensuring that the normative discussion retains a degree of real-world applicability.  
Finally, the framework grants states the ability to pursue any enforcement remedy that 
does not undermine the rights of other states, thus ensuring that states will be able to 
modify their prosecution strategies as the technological landscape changes.140  
                                                
136  See H.R. 2046 §§ 5383(g)(2), 5385(c)(2).  
137  This requirement would impose an affirmative duty on sites to identify and take 
measures to prevent common means of defeating geolocation and other verification systems. 
138  H.R. 2046 § 5385(a)(2).  
139  H.R. 2046 § 5383(g)(3)-(4).  
140  See infra Part IV.B.1.  
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B. The Argument for Jurisdictional Differentiation in Internet Gambling Law 
The argument in favor of using geolocation technologies to create a 
jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory model, such as the hypothetical framework 
introduced above, relies on three main points.   
1. Honoring Important Federalism Principles 
First, a jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory approach would give much 
greater weight to the democratic will of citizens on both sides of the Internet gambling 
debate.  As noted at the outset of this Article, gambling is a sensitive social issue that has 
long been dealt with at the state, rather than federal, level due to the wide range of public 
opinion on the matter.141  Using geolocation technology to recreate state borders on the 
Internet would honor important federalism principles by restoring the historical federal-
state balance with respect to regulation of gambling.  In this sense, geolocation 
technologies serve to correct the jurisdictional distortion caused by Internet architecture 
in the first place,142 fixing many of the political problems concerning Internet gambling 
regulation along the way. 
Further, in a jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory model, states morally 
disapproving of gambling would have a much easier time expressing and enforcing that 
disapproval in law, while those supporting gambling would be able to better serve the 
individual liberty interests of their citizens.143  In contrast, regulation of the Internet by a 
single, undifferentiated set of laws would likely result in a lowest-common-denominator 
regime with which few would be satisfied.144  Indeed, the Internet’s development over the 
past decade clearly demonstrates that consumers want precisely the kind of granular 
experience that jurisdictional differentiation would provide.145  Aside from the more 
particular advantages detailed below, this increased responsiveness of the law to the 
collective will in each state is a desirable end in itself.146 
                                                
141  See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
142  See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1956, 1960-62.  
143  See Goodman, supra note 6, at 410; Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1972-73. 
144  See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 45. 
145  Id. at 43-45. 
146  Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense 
of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 774-779 (1995) (discussing various advantages 
of lawmaking at the state, as opposed to federal, level); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: 
Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1484, 1494 (1987) (book review) 
(illustrating hypothetical scenarios in which decentralized lawmaking results in higher overall 
social utility). 
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2. Increased Compliance with the Rule of Law 
Second, a jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory approach would substantially 
increase compliance with the rule of law.  Currently, countless Internet gambling sites are 
operating in flagrant violation of federal and state laws.147  In this regard, the Internet’s 
architecture is being used to defeat the rule of law, or in the words of Joel Reidenberg, to 
launch a “denial of service attack” on the law itself.148  While it may be true that “code is 
law” as a practical matter, the better normative view—at least with respect to divisive 
issues such as Internet gambling—is that law should be supreme over code.  This is so 
not only because states have a duty to protect their citizens from all forms of harm, 
whether digital or analog,149  but also because the law carries a legitimacy that code can 
never possess150 and because technology alone is incapable of addressing online harms 
such as underage gambling.151   
A jurisdictionally differentiated approach would re-establish the primacy of law 
over code more effectively than current law because it would offer Internet gambling 
providers two extremely attractive benefits for compliance.  To begin with, a model like 
the one introduced in Part IV.A would offer Internet gambling sites the opportunity to do 
business within the United States without fear of prosecution by the newly empowered 
state attorneys general.  Under current law, states—the entities with the greatest financial 
incentive to police Internet gambling152—are prohibited from taking meaningful 
enforcement action by virtue of the Dormant Commerce Clause.153  Within the proposed 
                                                
147  See supra Part II.A.  
148  See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1953, 1969.  
149  See id. at 1956, 1969; see also Commonwealth v. 141 Internet Domain Names, No. 08-
CI-1409 at 39 (Franklin Cir. Ct. Ky. Oct. 16, 2008) (order amending the September 18, 2008 
seizure order), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/ky_v_domainnames/order-
Kentuckyvs141InternetDomains.pdf. (“The Internet … is still not above the law, whether on an 
International or municipal level.”); see also Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 167 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (indicating that inventiveness does not excuse Internet technologies from 
compliance with the law). 
150  See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1969 (“[T]he rule of law . . . must be supreme over 
technological claims.”).  
151  Cf. id., at 1970.  Notably, the same principle is increasingly accepted in the defamation 
context, as victims of online hate speech have had to turn more and more to the law to address 
harms that technology simply could not.  See, e.g., Doe v. Ryan, No. 3:07-cv-00909 (D. Conn. 
filed June 8, 2007) (suit involving defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 
related claims against pseudonymous defendants posting on the “Autoadmit.com” message 
board).  
152  See supra notes 49, 67-68 and accompanying text.   
153  See Olson, supra note 4, para. 35.  While federal agencies currently have the legal 
authority to prosecute unlawful Internet gambling, the Department of Justice and the Treasury 
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framework, however, this limitation on state enforcement would disappear since federal 
law would give each state full authority over Internet gambling within its own borders.154  
The flexible remedy provided by this framework could be used by states to enjoin 
Internet gambling sites from providing unauthorized gambling services, and if a site 
persisted despite such an injunction, could allow for more direct measures.  These 
measures could include targeted physical-layer blockades, which would involve directing 
Internet Service Providers to block access to a particular site,155 or a “bad actors list” that 
would direct banks to block all transactions to or from accounts associated with sites 
violating the new law.156  In this way, jurisdictional differentiation would allow robust 
experimentation at the state level that is not possible under current law and which would 
not be possible under a new uniform national standard.  Eventually, this increased 
experimentation in the states could yield more effective enforcement techniques, more 
                                                
Department are not subject to the same kind of financial and political incentives that state 
prosecutors, many of whom must run for reelection, typically face.  As a result, these federal 
agencies are likely much less motivated than state officials with regard to prosecution of Internet 
gambling violations.  Cf. supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (detailing Kentucky’s attempt 
to regulate internet gambling where the Dormant Commerce Clause blocked it from doing so). 
154  Cf. Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 43 (“[W]hat we once called a global network is 
becoming a collection of nation-state networks—networks linked by the Internet protocol, but for 
many purposes separate”); Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1973 (“[I]nnovations in information 
technology will undermine the technological assault on state jurisdiction”); Svantesson, supra 
note 97, at 102-03 (“[G]eo-identification has the advantage of providing the Web site operator 
with the means to comply with multiple, varying, and even contradictory, local regulations”). 
155  Such measures might mirror Minnesota’s current ISP-blocking effort, see Svensson, 
supra note 64, or state-sanctioned technological assaults as proposed by Reidenberg.  See 
Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1963 (“States can use filters and packet interceptors as well as 
hacker tools like viruses and worms to enforce decisions . . . .”).  
156  While numerous commenters argued that such a list should have been incorporated into 
the Treasury Department’s regulations implementing UIGEA, the Department ultimately rejected 
such a proposal.  See Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet Gambling, 73 Fed. Reg. 
69,382, 69,383 (Nov. 18, 2008) (“About 40 commenters responded to the Agencies’ request for 
comment on whether to incorporate within the rule a list of unlawful Internet gambling 
businesses.  About 35 commenters of various types—depository institutions and associations 
thereof, payment system operators and money transmitters, as well as public-policy groups—
expressed support for such a list, generally on the grounds that it would reduce the cost of 
complying with the rule . . . .”).  Such a list could be operated by the federal government while 
giving states the option to add new accounts to the list once the state proves that (1) a site violated 
the state’s law under the framework; and (2) the accounts in question belonged to the site or the 
site’s owners or affiliates.  This arrangement would shift the cost of keeping the list up to date to 
the more highly motivated state actors, while ensuring that the list would be effectively managed 
at the federal level.   
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successful programs to combat money laundering and underage gambling, and other 
sector-specific benefits.157 
While the threat of prosecution has not produced overwhelming results under the 
current prohibition regime, recent evidence shows that this result is far from inevitable.  
In fact, when prosecutors do focus on a particular Internet gambling operator, they can be 
extremely effective in bringing about compliance.  In December 2008, the founder of 
Party Gaming LLC, one of the largest online casinos, agreed to pay $300 million in fines 
and serve up to two years in prison for Wire Act violations.158  Party Gaming 
subsequently entered into a plea agreement of its own, and will pay $105 million in fines 
in exchange for reprieve from criminal sanctions.159  Party Gaming no longer does 
business in the United States, and the plea agreement is thought to foreshadow Party 
Gaming’s re-entry into the U.S. market if IGRCPEA or other legalization measures 
become law.160  As further evidence of the compliance that can be brought about by 
strong enforcement efforts, several other Internet gambling companies voluntarily exited 
the U.S. market following passage of UIGEA in 2006.161    
Further, sites complying with a jurisdictionally differentiated Internet gambling 
regime would reap a tremendously valuable reputational benefit.  Presently, Internet 
gambling sites are subject to little or no regulatory authority, leading to a series of 
cheating scandals.162  These scandals have shaken players’ confidence in the fairness of 
some online casinos, causing those casinos’ bottom lines to suffer.163  In a framework 
such as the one introduced in Part IV.A, sites complying with geolocation and other 
requirements would receive a government operating license.  That license could in turn 
be used by sites as a signal that the games they offer are both fair and secure.  Such an 
approach would harness competitive forces within the Internet gambling marketplace to 
                                                
157  Cf. Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition among State Legal Systems, 6 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 127, 129 (1982) (“Instead of working through a nationwide body sitting around 
deciding what ought to be in the U.C.C., the same result would be achieved by finding a way for 
states to make money by writing a law. In no time, there would be a commercial code, in fact, 
several commercial codes, perfect for everyone”).   
158  See Party Gaming Founder Pleads Guilty in US, Bus. World, Dec. 17, 2008.  
159  Jennifer Newell, PartyGaming Settles With U.S. Dept. of Justice for $105 Million, Bluff 
Mag., Apr. 7, 2009, http://news.bluffmagazine.com/partygaming-settles-with-us-dept-of-justice-
for-105-million-3012/.  
160  Id. 
161  See Fiona Walsh, Last chance saloon for online gaming firms, The Guardian, Oct. 13, 
2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/oct/13/gambling.newmedia. 
162  Chuck Blount, Online Scandals Show Need for U.S. Regulation, San Antonio Express-
News, Dec. 4, 2008, at 3D.  
163  Id. 
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garner compliance.  If the law permitted only licensed operators to advertise in the United 
States, this approach would be even more effective.  
3. Eliminating Inefficiencies As to Costs and Revenues 
Third, jurisdictional differentiation offers a means to eliminate several 
inefficiencies built into the current prohibition regime.  As discussed in Part II.B, 
prohibition of Internet gambling gives rise to substantial direct costs, or externalities, in 
the form of WTO sanctions.  Despite the fact that support for prohibition is clearly not 
universal,164 all fifty states bear the burden of this externality—meaning that states 
favoring prohibition are free riding on those that oppose prohibition.  By doing so, this 
model would allow states to express the intensity of their preferences regarding Internet 
gabling in ways that are not possible under current law.165  This model would have the 
added benefit of enabling states to express the intensity of their preferences with respect 
to Internet gambling in ways that are not possible under the current federal law regime.     
Turning to indirect costs, a jurisdictionally differentiated system would permit 
states seeking to improve their bottom line to capture huge amounts of new tax 
revenue.166  Though similar revenues could be generated under a national, rather than a 
jurisdictionally differentiated approach, the latter has the benefit of producing the same 
result without forcing legalized Internet gambling on states morally opposed to it.  Given 
the magnitude of the financial crisis in most state budgets,167 a jurisdictionally 
differentiated approach to Internet gambling is vastly more efficient than the alternative.   
Finally, a jurisdictionally differentiated enforcement structure could reduce 
uncertainty as to the legality of gambling activities such as poker.168  One of the main 
reasons many Americans continue to gamble online is a lack of clarity in the law, brought 
on in part by the complex patchwork of interrelated federal and state laws.  
                                                
164  See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); supra note 91 
and accompanying text. 
165  I use the term “primarily” here because it seems impossible to devise a system whereby 
states responsible for prohibition bear these costs exclusively.  To date, direct costs occasioned by 
prohibition of Internet gambling have not been money damages.  Rather, they have been 
structured trade preferences, as seen in the U.S.-E.U. settlement described in Part II.B.1.  Since 
these preferences often relate to a particular market sector or series of market sectors, it stands to 
reason that their effects would be felt in any state where those sectors are present.  With that 
principle in mind, the U.S. Trade Representative could theoretically tailor settlement terms to 
primarily affect states favoring prohibition by focusing concessions on industries prominent in 
those states.   
166  See supra Part II.B.2.  
167  See States Need Deep Cutback, supra note 71, at A8. 
168  See Rotstein, supra note 5, at A1; Batt, supra note 5, at 1D; see also Sullum, supra note 
5, at 38; Wickert, supra note 5, at 235-236.  
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Implementation of a jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory structure backed by 
geolocation technologies would shift compliance costs from individual users to the 
Internet gambling operators, who are surely the least cost actors with regard to 
determining and applying the law in each jurisdiction.        
C. The Argument Against Jurisdictional Differentiation in Internet Gambling Law 
As with the argument in favor of jurisdictional differentiation, the argument 
against such an approach can be broken down into three fundamental points.  While these 
counterarguments must be taken seriously, they fail to outweigh the advantages discussed 
in Part IV.B. 
1. Technological Ineffectiveness 
One of the primary arguments made by critics of IGRCPEA specifically and of 
jurisdictional differentiation generally is that geolocation technologies are unreliable.  
Despite the massive investment that has been poured into geolocation technologies, 
critics argue that these technologies still fail twenty to thirty percent of the time.169 
Additionally, geolocation technologies are particularly ineffective at handling “curveball” 
situations such as increasingly common mobile wireless Internet access cards.170  On top 
of that, software devices such as Tor are both widely available and extremely adept at 
circumventing even the most sophisticated geolocation systems.171 Thus, the argument 
goes, it is hardly a good idea to use these unreliable technologies as the linchpin of a new 
federal regulatory regime. 
There are two main responses to these points.  First, no mode of regulation, 
whether jurisdictionally differentiated or not, will be 100 percent effective.172  The 
current patchwork of federal and state laws has been extremely unsuccessful, as 
evidenced by the $7 billion Americans spend on Internet gambling annually.173  Thus, the 
appropriate question is not whether a jurisdictionally differentiated regime will work 
flawlessly, but rather whether it will work better than current law.  Next, though there is 
no single, authoritative source of data on the reliability of geolocation technologies, there 
is good reason to believe that the level of effectiveness is much higher than suggested by 
                                                
169  Internet Gambling Hearing, supra n. 132 (statement of Jeff Schmidt, Chief Executive 
Officer of Authis). 
170  Id.  
171  See Ira S. Rubenstein, Ronald D. Lee, & Paul M. Schwartz, Surveillance: Data Mining 
and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
261, 275 (2008); Svantesson, supra note 97, at 113-14. 
172  See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 45.   
173  See Cholodofsky, supra note 7.   
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prominent critics.  Since most estimates run between 85 and 98 percent accurate,174 and 
these estimates are generally more recent than those cited by critics, it seems clear that 
technical limitations are not a valid reason to reject jurisdictional differentiation in 
Internet gambling law.  As the technology improves, this objection will become even less 
relevant.   
2. Forcing Debilitating Transaction Costs on Operators 
Another prominent counterargument is the claim that differentiation would force 
debilitating transaction costs on site operators.175  In the event that Internet gambling sites 
are subjected to the control of a multitude of jurisdictions, operators would have to know 
both the procedural and substantive laws in each and every one of those jurisdictions.176  
More than that, operators would also have to conform their conduct to each set of laws, 
even if those laws contradicted one another in significant ways.177  These requirements 
could result in crippling costs for Internet gambling operators, potentially causing some 
operators to forgo the venture altogether even if it was legal in some, or even most 
jurisdictions.178  Making matters worse, operators that do choose to stay in business could 
be subjected to vigilante-like responses from states opposing Internet gambling, such as 
state-sanctioned denial of service attacks.179 
All of these points are valid.  The best response is that jurisdictionally 
differentiated frameworks do not necessarily have to permit a wide range of local 
regulations.  The hypothetical framework described in Part IV.A seeks to address this 
issue by forcing states to elect one of three principal options: full legalization, partial 
legalization, or no legalization at all.  While this approach would effectively limit 
transaction costs within the United States, a treaty or other agreement would be necessary 
to replicate that compromise on an international level.  To some degree, GATS may play 
                                                
174  See supra note 103 and accompanying text (describing recent studies showing accuracy 
rates at the state level of between 85 and 98 percent).   
175  Cf. Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“[I]nconsistent regulatory schemes could paralyze the development of the Internet altogether.”). 
176  See Svantesson, supra note 97, at 132. 
177  See Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 168-69; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 19, at 
803-05. 
178  Cf. Am. Libraries Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 181 (“Regulation by any single state can only 
result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws subjecting Internet users to 
conflicting obligations”), Svantesson, supra note 97, at 137 (“The reality that different states have 
different substantive laws simply cannot be ignored, and the regulation of activities on the 
Internet must in one way or another take account of this reality”). 
179  See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1963-68. 
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a role in minimizing this issue as well, given the substantial penalties it levies on nations 
prohibiting Internet gambling.180 
3. Altering the Fundamental Character of the Internet 
Third, jurisdictional differentiation threatens to alter the fundamental character of 
the Internet as a whole.  Viewed broadly, this argument is an extension of the popular 
1990s argument that the very essence of the Internet defies imposition of borders of any 
kind.181  Some commentators have argued that allowing individual jurisdictions to assert 
their will over the Internet would invite a “race to the bottom” in which the open and 
diverse character of the Internet would eventually be lost.182   
Indeed, such a change could force all Internet content providers, whether in the 
Internet gambling sphere or other sectors, to shift from a starting assumption of one 
hundred percent content availability to a default of zero percent availability.  Only once 
an end-user could prove that she was legally permitted to view the content in question 
would that new default give way.183  Moreover, even if we accept jurisdictional 
differentiation as a good idea for Internet gambling, technologies meant for legitimate 
and socially desirable ends are rarely limited to those uses, meaning that IGRCPEA and 
the hypothetical framework above may both be a step down a slippery slope towards 
undesirable regulation of the rest of the Internet.184  In its most extreme form, 
jurisdictional differentiation could lead to regulation not at the operator level, but the ISP 
level, wherein end-users are forcibly authenticated in a manner that would eliminate the 
relative anonymity they have grown accustomed to.185  Minnesota began a campaign to 
impose precisely this type of physical layer blockade on Internet gambling sites in April 
                                                
180  But note that nations that do not allow gambling within their own borders will not be 
subject to WTO sanctions if they also prohibit provision of foreign gambling services via the 
Internet.  See GATS at art. XIV(a) (permitting exceptions “necessary to protect public morals or 
to maintain public order”). 
181  See Reidenberg, supra note 10, at 1952 (describing Yahoo!’s argument against 
jurisdiction in the French Nazi memorabilia case brought in 2000); see also Am. Libraries Ass’n, 
969 F. Supp. at 183. 
182  See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 43. 
183  See Svantesson, supra note 97, at 132. 
184  See Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 100, at 45. 
185  See id. at 44.  One commentator has suggested that more sophisticated forms of 
geolocation technology may violate European privacy laws.  See Svantesson, supra note 97, at 
135. 
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2009.186  In essence, this blockade would operate by allowing the state government to 
instruct ISPs to block in-state users from accessing certain Internet gambling sites.187    
Unlike the more specific objections raised above, these counterarguments raise 
questions that go well beyond Internet gambling and reach into the future of the Internet 
as a whole.  To some extent, commentators have been suggesting for years that 
jurisdictional differentiation powered by geolocation technologies is a foregone 
conclusion, and that arguments for a “borderless” Internet are a quaint relic of a time 
when the architecture of the Internet looked very different than it does today.  More 
generally, resolution of these issues seems to depend in part on the interaction between 
law, markets, code, and norms.188  While both the market and the law appear to have 
sided with jurisdictional differentiation thus far,189 how this issue ultimately will play out 
in the future remains far from clear.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Gambling, like most divisive social issues, is best regulated at the state level.190  
Yet migration of gambling to the Internet has complicated matters greatly, giving rise to 
difficult questions as to which governmental entities are best suited to regulate and what 
the proper substantive regulatory regime ought to be.  The failure of energetic federal and 
state efforts to prohibit Internet gambling over the past decade suggests that the issue may 
present a nearly impregnable problem, or as this Article terms the matter, an Internet 
gambling Gordian knot. 
The rise of geolocation technologies in recent years offers a new opportunity to 
cut through that Gordian knot via a jurisdictionally differentiated regulatory framework 
for Internet gambling.  Geolocation technologies are not perfect.  However, when they 
are integrated into a federal-state framework in which states choose their own substantive 
policies from a limited “menu” of options, these technologies can dramatically improve 
the democratic responsiveness of Internet gambling laws, increase compliance with the 
rule of law, and internalize the large and increasing costs associated with prohibition of 
Internet gambling.  Such an approach is not immune to criticism, particularly in terms of 
its potential impact on the fundamental openness of the Internet in the long-term.  In light 
of the market advantages associated with jurisdictional differentiation and the need for 
law to be supreme over code in divisive areas such as Internet gambling, those drawbacks 
                                                
186  See Svensson, supra note 64. 
187  Id.  
188  See generally Lessig, supra note 14 (exploring the interaction between code and law).  
189  See Svantesson, supra note 97, at 134.   
190  Of course fundamental constitutional rights, even those subject to social controversy, 
should not be subject to state regulation.  Unlike those rights, gambling falls into a class of issues 
that is constitutionally unprotected and subject to widespread variation in state preferences.   
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fail to outweigh the potential benefits offered by aggressive use of geolocation 
technologies. 
These conclusions carry implications that go well beyond the Internet gambling 
debate.  If jurisdictional differentiation is a normatively superior approach with respect to 
Internet gambling, then it may be in other market sectors as well.  This consequence, 
along with the degree to which technological advances have undermined previous court 
decisions on electronic commerce issues, suggests that geolocation technologies may 
play a role in enabling federalism on the Internet for years to come. 
